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1Abstract
This paper examines the “Animal Eﬃcacy Rule,” a regulation that provides for the approval of products by
the FDA when eﬃcacy testing on humans is ethically impossible. It gives a summary of the history of the
enactment of this regulation and outlines its structure and major features. Next, the regulation is analyzed
in light of statutory authority, ethics, and practicality. Finally the approval of pyridostigmine bromide under
the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule is evaluated in light of these concerns to determine whether the rule is acting as
intended, illustrating remaining problems in implementation. The article concludes that while the Animal
Eﬃcacy Rule meets ethical requirements and is capable of being implemented given careful supervision, the
FDA does not have statutory authority to make such regulation and thus a legislative solution is preferable.
2In 1944 the United States government asked seventeen-year-old Nathan Schnurman to volunteer to test sum-
mer army uniforms, oﬀering him various fringe beneﬁts in exchange for his assistance.1 When he reported
for the testing, Schnurman was sealed in an air-tight chamber and repeatedly exposed to various chemical
weapons, including mustard gas.2 This exposure led to grave health consequences for him and his fellow
guinea pigs, including asthma, cancer, and pulmonary disease for which they were never adequately com-
pensated.3 The government justiﬁed their experimentation because it anticipated chemical weapon use by
Axis forces during World War II and needed to test clothing to protect against such devastating attacks.4
Ethical research has always pitted the scientiﬁc ideal of controlled trials against the moral respect of human
integrity. What happened in 1944 was not the ﬁrst time America has stretched ethical boundaries for the
cause of medical science, and unfortunately it would not be the last. 5
Human experimentation standards have developed to address these and other problems. Some diseases and
toxins, however, present dilemmas that exceed the scope of the current standards. For example, purposely
infecting volunteers in a controlled environment is a medically fruitful technique that is nonetheless fraught
with ethical problems. Few acceptable methods of drug development remain when a toxin is both rare,
making ﬁeld testing on previously exposed individuals unfeasible, and dangerous, making the intentional
infection of human subjects morally suspect. Informed consent requirements may not be a perfect answer
as they create non-representative samples in an experiment, hindering the predictive value of research.
This paper examines the way the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has handled these problems, be-
1Schnurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429, 430 (E.D. Va. 1980).
2Id. at 431.
3Michael J. O’Connor, Bearing True Faith and Allegiance? Allowing Recovery for Soldiers Under Fire in Military Experi-
ments that Violate the Nuremburg Code, 25 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 649, 658 (2002).
4Schnurman, 490 F. Supp. at 430.
5For a survey of such testing see Jonathan D. Moreno, Undue Risk (2000).
3ginning with a discussion of the FDA’s Gulf War testing policy and its sub-optimal results. This is followed
by an analysis of the current FDA regulatory scheme in a statutory, ethical, and practical context. Finally,
this paper proposes legislative empowerment of the FDA as a solution that gives the FDA the authority to
ethically evaluate drugs that cannot be ethically tested on humans.
Background
The challenges of ethical human testing came into focus in 1990 as the United States prepared for potential
biological warfare in Operation Desert Shield. Although anthrax and other exotic diseases are naturally
found in the region, Iraq had successfully weaponized lethal biochemical agents as evidenced by its “tests”
on Iranian and Kurdish populations. The impending war spurred a serious exploration of biochemical
countermeasures; an exploration that quickly conﬂicted with ethical research standards.
While treatments for some threatening toxins were already available, they involved drugs approved under
an “investigational new drug” (IND) protocol.6 At the IND stage a drug can only be used under certain
approved experimentation protocols before full approval. The FDA required informed consent from patients
receiving these experimental drugs, but acquiring such consent, already burdensome in a civilian context,
presented grave problems in the military context. The stakes could not be much higher. If soldiers refused to
take experimental treatments and as a result failed their missions because of illness or death, many additional
lives would certainly be lost. Even if consent were achieved, however, the moral issues would remain because
the rigid command structure of the military eroded the notion of consent practically to a ﬁction.7
6However, none of the IND protocols exactly covered the intended use against biomedical weapons: either the drugs in
question were to be used under diﬀerent conditions than those currently under study in the protocols, or were to be administered
in diﬀerent dosages or by diﬀerent methods.
7See, Ruth K. Miller, Informed Consent in the Military: Fighting a Losing Battle Against the Anthrax Vaccine, 28 Am.
4While preparing for biological war the Department of Defense (DOD) wrote to the FDA requesting a bat-
tleﬁeld exception to the IND protocols.8 This exception would recognize combat occasions where patient
consent was “not feasible.”9 In its request, the DOD outlined the dangers to military units and objectives if
soldiers were to refuse consent when given an investigational new drug. The letter proposed ﬁve limitations
on a “military exigency” waiver of informed consent:
(1)
[t]hat drug-by-drug requests for waiver be accompanied by written justiﬁ-
cation based on the intended uses and the military circumstances involved;
(2)
that no satisfactory alternative treatment is available;
(3)
that available safety and eﬃcacy data support the proposed use of the
drug or biologic product;
(4)
that each such request be approved by the applicable [DOD] Institutional
Review Board; and
(5) that the waivers be time-limited.10
J.L. & Med. 325 (2002).
8Letter from Department of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Aﬀairs to
Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for Health (Oct. 30, 1990), in
55 Fed. Reg. 52,814 (1990).
955 Fed. Reg. 52814, 52815 (December 21, 1990) [hereinafter “Interim Rule”] (referring to the informed consent guidelines
in 21 U.S.C. §§355(i), 357(d) that require consent by recipients of investigational new drugs and new biologics except where not
feasible).
10Interim Rule at 52815.
5Less than two months later, the FDA substantially granted the DOD’s request in an interim rule11 (the
“Interim Rule”) that applied to “speciﬁc military operation(s) involving combat or the immediate threat of
combat.”12 It adopted the DOD’s suggested procedure for granting of waivers, and subjected them to a one
year automatic expiration unless renewed at the DOD’s request.13
The Commissioner of Food and Drugs had ﬁnal discretion in determining whether to grant such a waiver,
and was expected to seek expert advice14 while weighing the following four factors:
(i)
The evidence of drug safety and eﬀectiveness;
(ii) The administering context, e.g., whether a drug is intended for battleﬁeld or hospital settings and
whether it will be professionally or self-administered;
(iii)
The nature of the targeted medical condition; and
(iv)
The nature of the information given to drug recipients concerning the potential
beneﬁts and risks treatment.15
The FDA eventually granted two Interim Rule waivers for pyridostigmine bromide (PB) and the botulinum
toxoid (BT) vaccine.16 PB is a pre-exposure nerve gas treatment thought to slow damage while the BT
11Id. at 52817 (codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. §50.23(d)).
12Id. at 52817 (codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. §50.23(d)(1)).
13Id. at 52817 (codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. §50.23(d)(4)).
14Id. at 52817 (codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. §50.23(d)(3)).
1662 Fed. Reg. 40996, 40997-98 (July 31, 1997).
6vaccine protects against botulism-based biological weapons.17 Both products were administered to military
personnel during Operation Desert Storm, but since the BT vaccine was administered on a voluntary basis
only the PB waiver was used.18
Unfortunately, the DOD’s subsequent PB waiver administration failed many FDA conditions.19 Soldiers re-
ceiving PB were only partially informed of its proper use20due in part to inadequate labeling.21 Additionally,
the DOD did not make reasonable follow-up eﬀorts to discover and report adverse drug-related experiences.22
The military failed to document which units took PB, when they did so, or under what circumstances.23
Standard Army follow-up surveys, as well as three subsequent PB safety surveys,24 fell far short of FDA
monitoring and reporting goals under the waiver. While one Journal of American Medicine study found
that PB was generally safe as a pretreatment for nerve gas exposure,25 other studies suggest that PB was
linked to Gulf War syndrome.26 This controversy cannot yet be resolved as eﬃcacy data on PB as a nerve
gas defense is unreliable—there are simply too few documented exposures.
The Interim Rule immediately created great controversy. In the thirty-day comment period following its
publication, several commentators accused the rule of violating fundamental human rights.27 Within a
month, an anonymous serviceman sued the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department
17Id. at 40997-98.
18Id. at 40998.
1964 Fed. Reg. 54180, 54184 (October 5, 1999).
20Id. at 54184.
21Id. at 54184.
22Id. at 54184. This is particularly problematic given the alleged connections between PB and Gulf War Syndrome, see,
e.g., GAO/T-NSIAD-97-190, Gulf War Illnesses: Enhanced Monitoring of Clinical Progress and of Research Priorities Needed
8 (1997); H.R. REP. 105-388, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., at p. 35, 67 (1997).
2362 Fed. Reg. 40996, 40998 (July 31, 1997).
24For example, Survey II went out to an unspeciﬁed number of recipients, making response bias impossible to quantify. Low
response rates also
25J.R. Keeler et al., Pyridostigmine Used as a Nerve Agent Pretreatment under Wartime Conditions, 266 J. Am. Med.
Ass’n. 693 (1991)
26See, e.g., Beatrice Alexandra Golomb, A Review of the Scientiﬁc Literature as it Pertains to Gulf War Illnesses: Volume
2: Pyridostigmine Bromide (RAND 1999), available at <http://www.gulﬂink.osd.mil/library/randrep/pb paper/>.
2764 Fed. Reg. 53960, 53962 (October 5, 1999) [hereinafter “Proposed Rule”].
7of Defense claiming that the procedures outlined in the Interim Rule violated the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA),28 the DOD Authorization Act,29 and Fifth Amendment due process.30 However, both
the district and appellate courts supported the FDA’s activity in promulgating the Interim Rule.31 Despite
this victory the reaction to the rule was critical on other fronts: the Presidential Advisory Committee on
Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses issued a report describing the problems with the application of the rule by
the DOD,32 and many scholars had weighed in against it.33 In 1997 the FDA requested comments on the
Interim Rule’s future that led to its ultimate revocation in 1999.34 A replacement statute strengthened IRB
requirements and outlined waiver qualiﬁcation guidelines. Most tellingly, the President was now given the
sole discretion to issue these military waivers of the informed consent rule.35
As it revoked the Interim Rule, the FDA proposed streamlining drug and biological product approval when
such items could only be tested ethically on animals. Under the new rule, animal eﬃcacy tests rather than
human clinical studies would suﬃce for drug approval.36 In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
Congress directed the FDA to facilitate approval of products that counteract chemical, biological, and
nuclear threats.37 The FDA complied by issuing a ﬁnal rule entitled “Evidence Needed to Demonstrate
2821 U.S.C. § 355.
2910 U.S.C. § 980 (prohibiting the DOD from using its funds for research on involuntary human subjects).
30Doe v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1991), aﬀ’d, Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
31Id. Both the district court and the appellate majority held that the FDA’s decision was reviewable but within FDA’s
statutory discretion; the lone dissenting justice argued that the case was moot because the conﬂict during which the drugs had
been approved for use was over.
3262 Fed. Reg. 40996-01, 41000 (July 31, 1997).
33See, e.g., George J. Annas, Mengele’s Birthmark: The Neuremburg Code in United States Courts, 7 J. Contemp. Health
L. & Pol’y 17, 41 (1991); Suzanne B. Seftel, Waving for the Flag: Should Informed Consent Rules Apply in the Context of
Military Emergencies?, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1387 (1992); Elliot J. Schuchardt, Distinguishing Between Research and Medical
Practice During Operation Desert Storm, 49 Food & Drug L.J. 271 (1994).
3464 Fed. Reg. 54180-01 (October 5, 1999). FDA received 135 comments on the Interim Rule, of which 119 recommended its
revocation and only two favored its retention. Id at 54181. FDA’s reasons for revoking the rule, addressed in these comments,
included problems with DOD oversight and recordkeeping, ethical inadequacy of information and consent to servicemen receiving
experimental drugs, and lack of follow-up to assess safety and eﬃcacy of the drugs received. Id at 54181, 54183-84.
35See id.; 10 USC § 1107(f); 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d)(1).
36Proposed Rule at 53960.
37Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188 § 123, 116 Stat.
594, 613 (2002).
8Eﬀectiveness of New Drugs When Human Eﬃcacy Studies Are Not Ethical or Feasible.”38 This rule would
allow for limited approval of products based on animal eﬃcacy tests alone when human eﬃcacy tests are not
possible. While the rule presents an ethical solution to the dilemma of drug approval and human testing, it
is unfortunately beyond the FDA’s authority.
Current Regulations: The Animal Eﬃcacy Rule
Current FDA regulations avoid consent problems in military or emergency situations through limited drug
approval based on animal eﬃcacy tests alone (the “Animal Eﬃcacy Rule”). Codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314
(drugs) and pt. 601 (biological products), the rules outline the approval process, postmarketing safety and
promotional material regulations, and approval revocation.
These sections only apply to products meeting all of the following requirements:
(1)
Purposely exposing healthy individuals to the toxic substances is unethical and thereby prohibits human eﬃcacy studies
(2)
Product study after accidental or hostile exposure to toxic substances is infeasible
(3)
3867 Fed. Reg. 37988 (May 31, 2002) [hereinafter “Final Rule”].
9The product cannot be approved under any other FDA eﬃcacy standards (e.g. surrogate markers)39
(4)
Both the toxic substance’s pathophysiology and the product’s eﬀect on this physiology are reasonably well-understood
(5)
This desired eﬀect of curing or preventing illness is demonstrated in multiple animal species that are likely predictive of human response, or it is demonstrated in a single species that is well-characterized to predict human response
(6)
There is a clear relationship between the animal study outcome and the desired beneﬁt in humans (e.g. survival or prevention of major morbidity)
(7)
There is relevant data on kinetics,40 pharmacodynamics,41 or other aspects of the product to allow eﬀective dose selection in humans.42
The regulations provide additional safeguards by providing for approval withdrawal in certain circumstances.
To prevent drug misuse, animal-eﬃcacy-based approval may be withdrawn when postmarketing studies are
negligently performed, when marketing restrictions inadequately provide safe public use, or when promotional
materials are misleading.43 Signiﬁcantly, if postmarketing studies fail to verify the product’s eﬃcacy or
other data indicate the product is unsafe or ineﬀective, approval will be revoked.44 This contrasts with the
revocation of an IND, which requires not a mere lack of eﬀectiveness data, but rather “convincing evidence”
that the drug is ineﬀective.45 The Animal Eﬃcacy Rule’s heightened standards better protect the public
43Id. at 37995, 37997 (codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R.§314.620 (a)(3)-(5), §601(a)(3)-(5)).
44Id. at 37995, 37997 (codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. § 314.620 (a)(1), (a)(6) and §601.92(a)(1), (a)(6))
4521 C.F.R. § 312.44(b)(2)(iii).
10when compared to drugs left in approval limbo under an IND protocol.
Are the new regulations a step in the right direction?
Although the 2002 regulations responded to the ﬁasco created by the Interim Rule,46 they target a diﬀer-
ent problem.47 The Animal Eﬃcacy Rule is broader than the Interim Rule; addressing not only the mass
administration of drugs not tested on humans, but also the business model necessary to produce them.
The former strategy of granting indeﬁnite IND status to drugs results in dangerously stiﬂed development.
Without approval prospects, investigational drug production is likely incapable of supplying large civilian
populations, for example after a metropolitan bioterrorism attack. However, actual approval possibilities
through animal trials would hasten drug research and development that otherwise had little hope of oﬃcial
approval (since we are only considering cases where human trials are prohibited).48 Approved status also
makes animal-tested drugs more quickly available when needed. If these drugs remained investigational,
new treatment protocols would need to be cleared by an institutional review board even for life-threatening
diseases.49 If approved these drugs would be available immediately without speciﬁc approval.50
Drug approval based largely on animal eﬃcacy studies is not unprecedented. In August 2000 the agency
approved the use of ciproﬂoxacin for treating inhalation anthrax without standard clinical studies.51 Also,
46Proposed Rule at 53960.
47Waiver of informed consent in military exigencies is still possible, although the rules for doing so were signiﬁcantly amended
during the 1990s. The new regulations delegate this power to the President and provide for more detailed safeguards to follow
up on INDs where consent has been waived. 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f); 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d)(1).
48Cf. Congress’ treatment of orphan drugs, creating incentives to develop such drugs and bring them to market rather than
allowing FDA to maintain indeﬁnite “orphan IND” status. Peter Barton Search Term Begin Hutt & Search Term End
Richard A. Merrill, Search Term Begin Food Search Term End and Search Term Begin Drug Law 556Search Term
End 55655 (2d ed. 1991).
4921 C.F.R. §§ 312.30, 312.34.
50See Carol Marcus, Ph.D., M.D., Comment on 62 Fed. Reg. 40996 (August 19, 1997), available at
<http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/98n0237/bkg0001-03-ref0002.pdf> (suggesting that this also could be eﬀected by
an “advance buy-in” by national and/or local IRBs).
51Some animal studies of eﬃcacy were available, as well as assorted human case studies. Medical Review of Ciproﬂaxin,
Application No.: 19-537/S38, 19-847/S24, 19-857/S27, 19-858/S21, & 20-780/S8, approved 8/30/2000, at 32, available at
11in November 2001, after a spate of letter-borne anthrax attacks, the FDA allowed doxycycline and penicillin
G procaine to be labeled for use as post-exposure protection against inhalation anthrax.52 The FDA based
its decision on rhesus monkey experiments, laboratory studies, and data from a 1979 anthrax outbreak in
Sverdlovsk in the former Soviet Union.53 Although these examples represent a departure from the typical
guidelines they remain a precedent for drug approval that relies on animal studies.
The Animal Eﬃcacy Rule seems on the surface to have successfully addressed many of the challenges pre-
sented by the Interim Rule by simply codifying and extending a practice FDA had used before: the approval
of certain drugs and biological products based on sparse evidence of eﬃcacy in humans. In addressing the
ﬂaws of the Interim Rule, the new standards obviate the need for heightened experimental consent because
drugs are formally approved and no longer investigational. Additionally, the new standards remove the dis-
tinction between military and civilian use because diﬀering safety standards created a perverse incentive to
use military personnel as captive subjects for medical testing.54 Finally, the withdrawal provisions and mar-
keting regulations acknowledge the need for approved drug follow-up and monitoring as problems may arise
after widespread use; a lesson learned during the First Gulf War. Nonetheless, this rule is still vulnerable to
criticism on statutory, ethical, and practical levels.
Statutory Authority
The Animal Eﬃcacy Rule’s clearest vulnerability is its tenuous statutory authority. The FDCA authorizes
the FDA to approve drugs based on “substantial evidence,” meaning “evidence [of eﬃcacy] consisting of
<http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/nda/2000/19-537S038 Cipro medr.pdf>
5266 Fed. Reg. 55679-03 (November 2, 2001).
53Id. at 55680-81.
54Sidney Wolfe, M.D. & Michael Tankersley, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Comment on 62 FR 40996 (October 30, 1997),
available at <http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/98n0237/bkg0001-07-ref0006.pdf >.
12adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts....”55 “Clinical
investigations” have long been understood both by the FDA and by the medical community to include human
tests. Approving drugs on the basis of animal studies alone represents a departure from this longstanding
interpretation, and it is not clear that the FDA has the authority to make such a drastic change on its own
authority.
If a court were reviewing FDA interpretation of the FDCA, it would apply the two-step analysis announced
in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).56 In the ﬁrst
step of Chevron, a court must ascertain whether Congress directly addressed the contested question.57 In
this case, the statute clearly calls for “clinical investigations” which the general medical community and
even the FDA itself deﬁne as trials performed on humans, not animals.58 Alternatively, if a court deems
the statute ambiguous as to human testing requirements, it can defer to novel interpretations of “clinical
investigation” but only if it is a “permissible” construction, In our case, only a tortured interpretation of
“clinical investigations” can include animals since it goes against both regular usage of the term and the
FDA’s past practice.59 Under Chevron the FDA cannot redeﬁne statutory terms at will and, consequently,
the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule is beyond the FDA’s authority.
When the FDA ﬁrst proposed the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule, it cited United States v. Article of Drug... Bacto-
Unidisk...60 in support of its statutory re-reading. Bacto-Unidisk gave the FDA authority to interpret its
5521 U.S.C. § 355(d) In the Proposed Rule, the FDA notes that its interpretation of “substantial evidence” has always included
human eﬃcacy studies, but implies that this need not be the case. Proposed Rule at 53964.
56See also Doe v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12, 15 (D.D.C. 1991) (citing Chevron as the appropriate standard of review for the
FDA’s interpretation of the FDCA).
57Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)
58See 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (“Clinical investigation means any experiment in which a drug is administered or dispensed to,
or used involving, one or more human subjects.”).
59Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
60394 U.S. 784, 799 (1969).
13enabling statute broadly to eﬀect stated Congressional policy goals.61 In Bacto-Unidisk, a regulated item fell
beyond the traditional medical deﬁnitions of “drug,” but the FDA chose to regulate it as a drug nonetheless.62
The Court held that, in the context of the FDCA, the word “drug” is a term of art encompassing more than
a strict medical deﬁnition.63 If Bacto-Unidisk merely stands for the fact that an agency may interpret a
statutory term more broadly than its usual meaning, then it is ﬁtting precedent for the FDA’s broader
interpretation of “clinical investigations” encompassing animal trials. However, the Bacto-Unidisk holding
is inapplicable for several reasons.
Although the Bacto-Unidisk Court noted that statutory deﬁnitions may be broader than medical meanings,
it still anchored proper interpretation to a term’s literal meaning.64 In our case, the deﬁnition of “clinical
investigations” is not nearly as ambiguous as “drug.” The fact that “drug” is explicitly deﬁned in the FDCA
suggests that it is a term of art, further detaching its meaning from the medical community’s understanding.
“Clinical investigations,” however, is not explicitly used as a term of art by the FDCA, and its use before
the FDA’s recent reinterpretation was unambiguous and uncontested.65 Furthermore, deﬁnitions of “clinical
investigations” elsewhere in federal regulations explicitly specify that human subjects must be involved.66
To interpret animal experiments as “clinical investigations” for a human drug is clearly contradictory to the
body of federal regulation.
61United States v. Article of Drug... Bacto-Unidisk..., 394 U.S. 784, 799 (1969)
62The disputed item was a disc that measured patient resistance to certain antibiotics, and arguably falls under the FDCA
deﬁnitions of either drugs or medical devices.
63Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. at 793.
64Id. at 798.
65See, e.g., National Institutes of Health, An Introduction to Clinical Trials (visited August 14, 2003)
<http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ct/info/whatis#whatis> (clinical trials involve research in “human volunteers”); University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Handbook for the Oﬃce of Clinical Trials pt. I § II (clinical trials deﬁned as involving human
subjects).
66See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 56.102(c) (“Clinical investigation means any experiment that involves a test article and one or more
human subjects....”); 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (noting that the interpretation of “clinical investigations” depends on the intended
use of the drug, so that drugs intended for use in humans must be tested in investigations on humans: “as used in this section
‘clinical investigations,’ ‘clinical experience,’ and ‘clinical signiﬁcance’ mean in the case of drugs intended for administration to
man, investigations, experience, or signiﬁcance in humans, and in the case of drugs intended for administration to other animals,
investigations, experience, or signiﬁcance in the specie or species for which the drug is advertised”); 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a)
(“Clinical investigation means any experiment other than a bioavailability study in which a drug is administered or dispensed
to, or used on, human subjects.”)
14The Bacto-Unidisk Court based its decision on legislative history supporting a broad “drug” deﬁnition as
well as the term’s inherent ambiguity.67 Yet the Court warned that a statute should not be interpreted
beyond the point where Congress clearly would have it stop.68 Here there is no indication that Congress
gave the FDA power to broaden the deﬁnition of clinical trials. On the contrary, the core purpose of the
FDCA is to ensure “that every drug or device is safe and eﬀective,” not to lower drug approval standards.69
While the 107th Congress did express approval of the animal eﬃcacy rule by directing FDA to complete
the rulemaking process,70 this is not determinative as to the proper statutory interpretation of the term.
The “clinical investigations” language was added as part of the Drug Amendments of 1962, and legislative
history of the amendments indicates that Congress always contemplated “clinical investigations” of human,
not animal, subjects.71
The FDA excuses itself from following the clear statutory language by appealing to the law’s public health
goals. This argument is very weak. There are innumerable actions that arguably promote public health that
the FDA is statutorily barred from pursuing.72 The FDCA did not give the FDA unbridled discretion to
pursue all public health goals but rather bound the FDA closely to the text of its founding document. Even
if “a literal reading of a statute would thwart the purposes of Congress,” and lead to an absurd result, the
FDA “may deviate no further from the statute than is needed to protect congressional intent.”73 Therefore
the FDA must argue that its new interpretation of “clinical investigations” is a necessary reading of the
clear statutory language to prevent an absurd reading of the statute while going no farther than necessary
67Id. at 798-99.
68Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. at 800.
69Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 142 (2000)
70Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188 § 123, 116 Stat.
594, 613 (2002).
71See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 87-1744, at 15 (1962) (illustrations of clinical trials take place in “hospitals and clinics,” which
suggests that only human trials were envisioned). ; Id. At 58. (This passage quotes the Senate subcommittee testimony
of Eugene N. Beesley. Beesley discusses the proper interpretation of “substantial evidence” as clinical trials on “patients,”
suggesting that humans and not animals were intended.).
72For example, the FDA does not have authority to tax harmful items like cigarettes, alcohol, or junk food to reduce
consumption.
73Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
15to protect Congressional intent. Given the existence of many alternative methods of providing drugs when
human tests are unethical,74 resort to the strained Animal Eﬃcacy Rule interpretation of “clinical trials”
clearly amounts to a greater deviation from the plain meaning of the statute than is necessary. Moreover,
the FDA’s statutory interpretations are governed by the more recent Chevron framework, casting Bacto-
Unidisk’s remaining precedential value into question.
The Animal Eﬃcacy Rule is an inappropriate stretch of FDA authority under any possible framework of
statutory interpretation, whether following Bacto-Unidisk or Chevron. If this rule is truly the only viable
way to approve drugs that cannot be ethically tested on humans, Congress is free to amend the FDCA to
provide an exception to the “clinical investigations” requirements. Congress indicated its support for current
regulations by speciﬁcally directing the FDA to complete its work on the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule75 and has
even provided fast-track designation to products approved using animal trials alone.76 Congress has shown a
surprising willingness and ability to act quickly in modifying testing guidelines when circumstances warrant.
Since Congress cannot and need not abdicate its policy-making role to the FDA, the FDA’s unsupported
statutory interpretation should not stand.
Ethical Issues
While the average citizen will not be incensed by an overstep of the FDA’s statutory authority, ethical
violations strike at the heart of the trust Americans put in their government, especially when there is a risk
74For example, drugs may be provided via an IND protocol or as oﬀ-label uses. While not ideal, these do represent treatment
options when human experiments cannot be performed.
75Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188 § 123, 116 Stat.
594, 613 (2002).
76Id. at § 122(b).
16that ethical shortcuts may threaten health. The debate about Gulf War drugs gained much prominence and
staying power in the media because of allegations of unethical behavior, not because of any technical problems
with the regulatory or scientiﬁc decisions made. In fact, the perception of even scientiﬁc and medical facts
can be aﬀected by whether they are viewed as ethical or unethical. It is likely that the association of PB
with the Interim Rule, viewed by many as unethical, inﬂuenced public opinion of both the danger of PB
and the government’s trustworthiness when they claimed it was not linked to Gulf War syndrome. The
Animal Eﬃcacy Rule will be under scrutiny as a result of its ethically charged history, thus it is important
to determine whether it is in fact more ethically acceptable than the Interim Rule.
Before examining the thorny ethical issues of experimentation, we must ﬁrst deﬁne “experiment.” While
there are statutory determinations of what constitutes experimental use, ethically this designation is ir-
relevant. Ethical principles rely not on terminology but on the purpose of a product’s use.77 When a
product is used to increase general knowledge about a treatment, it is experimental. On the other hand,
if its primary focus is successful individualized patient care, it is therapeutic.78 At ﬁrst glance the Animal
Eﬃcacy Rule only solves the problem of non-consensual experimentation through creative semantics. The
FDA merely changed a product designated “unapproved” under an IND (but used indeﬁnitely) to condi-
tionally approved.79 However, it is the purpose of an activity, not its bare legal designation, that determines
experimental or therapeutic status. Thus oﬀ-label drug use,80 even if unapproved by the FDA, may be
77National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, The Belmont Re-
port: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research (1979), at pt. A, available at
<http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.htm> [herinafter “The Belmont Report”].
78James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Oﬀ-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions,
53 Food & Drug L.J. 71, 81 (1998). See also The Belmont Report at pt. A.
79See Carol S. Marcus, Ph.D., M.D., University of California, Los Angeles, Comment on 62 Fed. Reg. 40996 (August 19,
1997), available at <http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/98n0237/bkg0001-03-ref0002.pdf> (noting that the risks to
human subjects are unchanged if drugs are approved based on animal trials compared to their former status as INDs).
80For example, use of most drugs on children is oﬀ-label because approval is generally based on adult testing alone. Other
drugs may be approved for one purpose and commonly used oﬀ-label for another, as occurred in the well-known case of Fen-Phen.
17therapeutic when used outside of research protocols and when patient well-being is the primary aim.81 Just
as unapproved oﬀ-label uses82 generally represent state-of-the-art medical practices, drugs approved on an-
imal tests alone may be the cutting-edge for treating otherwise untestable and uncurable diseases.83 A
non-experimental therapeutic use, then, would not trigger the heightened informed consent requirements
associated with research but only the usual requirement that a physician notify his patient of material risks
involved in a treatment, which applies regardless of how the drug was approved.84 Naturally the nature of
the evidence for a treatment’s eﬀectiveness is a factor in the risks that would be discussed with a patient,
but it need not aﬀect the kind of consent required. The ethical status of a therapeutic treatment is not
related to informed consent like that required for experimentation, but rather to the highly individualized
assessment of risks vs. beneﬁts to the patient.
The ethical status of the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule ultimately turns on whether drugs and biological products
can in fact be determined to have a favorable risk/beneﬁt ratio based on animal studies alone. Naturally,
eﬃcacy cannot be as reliably predicted from animal tests as from human tests. Unsurprisingly, due to the
problems inherent in extrapolating from animal data, less than 25% of drugs that are found eﬀective on
animals eventually gain FDA approval.85. However, given urgent need for treatments against highly lethal
agents, a drug need not be 100% eﬀective to be worthwhile. As long as a particular drug’s risks are less
than (and the beneﬁts greater than) the next-best treatment or no treatment at all, the drug is the optimal
therapeutic option.86 Animal eﬃcacy studies, along with human studies assessing safety, should adequately
81Beck & Azari at 82. See also The Belmont Report at pt. A.
82That is, uses that did not go through the usual four-stage FDA process
83For an in-depth discussion of the ethics of oﬀ-label use of drugs, see James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Oﬀ-Label
Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 Food & Drug L.J. 71 (1998).
84Cf. Beck & Azari at 85-86; 21 C.F.R. § 50 (governing informed consent requirements for research).
85David Ruppe, U.S. Response; Some Experts Express Caution on New FDA Measures,
86See Juan N. Walterspiel, M.D., Comment on 62 Fed. Reg. 40996 (October 3, 1997), available at
<http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/98n0237/bkg0001-04-ref0003.pdf>.
18determine the risk/beneﬁt ratio for a given drug or biological product.87 The uncertainty arising from having
no human studies would simply be factored into the product’s risk, proportionately aﬀecting the predicted
beneﬁt.
Some may claim that, despite therapeutic intent to treat, animal-eﬃcacy-approved products should be sub-
ject to experimental informed consent rules because the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule mandates close record-keeping
of side-eﬀects and evidence of eﬃcacy. Although this practice is broadly consistent with research, it is not
suﬃcient to transform a therapeutic use into an experimental one. The D.C. District Court said as much
by noting that mere information collecting does not transform drug eﬃcacy tracking into research.88 Thus
treatments using products approved under the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule are not experimental and need not
follow the informed consent requirements associated with human experimentation.89
To ensure that patients and doctors properly assess the risk/beneﬁt ratio of newly approved products, com-
plete and accurate labeling is essential. Several comments on the 1998 Proposed Rule addressed signiﬁcant
labeling inadequacies.90 The FDA responded by requiring explicit labeling disclosing when drugs were ap-
proved on animal eﬃcacy studies alone.91 Commentators also objected to language that only required special
labeling of these products “if possible.”92 They believed distributors would be able to use this language to
87See See Juan N. Walterspiel, M.D., Comment on 62 Fed. Reg. 40996 (October 3, 1997), available at
<http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/98n0237/bkg0001-04-ref0003.pdf>.
88Doe v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 1991).
89Under this analysis, it might be noted that the use of PB and botulinum toxoid vaccine by the DOD during the First Gulf
War also was not experimental. The goal of the use was not to gather information about the function of the products; this
could have been done more eﬀectively by maintaining control populations, monitoring and regulating variables involved and
at least by maintaining records of how and when the products were administered. Although these products were used in the
context of treatment and thus ethically did not require informed consent beyond that associated with any medical procedure,
FDA regulations still provide that treatment using a drug under an IND follow the rules for IND informed consent. Therefore
the PB use by the DOD was not unethical because it was an inappropriate experimentation on persons without their consent,
but may have run afoul of regular medical consent standards and certainly did not comport with the applicable legal standards.
90See, e.g., Anthony L. Itteilag, NIH Deputy Director of Management, Comment on 64 Fed. Reg. 53960 (May 28 1998),
available at < http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/98n0237/98n-0237-c000005.pdf>.
9121 C.F.R. § 314.610(b)(3), § 610.91(b)(3).
92Id.
19evade labeling requirements by exaggerating the burden additional labeling would require.93 In its ﬁnal
promulgation of the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule, the FDA clariﬁed that it would not extend the meaning of “pos-
sible” to include cases of mere inconvenience or eﬀort.94 If the FDA maintains this interpretation, labeling
requirements should provide suﬃcient consumer warning about special approval circumstances.
Drug advertising regulations in this context run a ﬁne line between burdening marketers’ free speech rights
and protecting consumers from misconstruing FDA approval. The FDA should utilize its pre-approval au-
thority over drug promotional materials95 to ensure consumer awareness of special circumstances surrounding
approval when only animal eﬃcacy tests have been conducted. If properly enforced these restrictions should
suﬃciently inform patients and doctors of product safety under the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule.
Practical Issues
Much of the implementation of the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule will be similar to procedures already in place for
the approval of new drug applications and INDs. Since product safety and eﬃcacy studies in animals are
already required to obtain an IND,96 human safety will presumably be assessed under the Animal Eﬃcacy
Rule in substantially the same way. The requirement that the manufacturer perform postmarketing studies
addresses the problem of inadequate follow-up on the drugs that were administered during the First Gulf
War. The manufacturer obviously has a strong interest in maintaining FDA approval, and therefore will be
more motivated to comply with the planned protocols than was the DOD in that case. FDA oversight of
93Final Rule at 37992.
94Id.
9521 C.F.R. § 314.640, § 601.94.
96Generally dosage must be determined based on studies in at least three species of animals and preclinical data from animals
establishes toxicological and pharmacokinetic properties of the new drug. Report of the Subcommittee on Science, etc. Peter
Barton Search Term Begin Hutt & Search Term End Richard A. Merrill, Search Term Begin Food Search Term
End and Search Term Begin Drug Law 514Search Term End 55655 (2d ed. 1991).
20postmarketing research protocols may also help ensure adequate follow-up testing.
Many practical issues in administrating the 2002 regulations were noted in responses to the 1999 proposed
rule including concerns about how certain terms would be deﬁned and how the FDA would determine when
a product was well-enough supported and understood to merit approval. In general the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule
addressed these concerns. In its ﬁnal ruling, the FDA clariﬁed many terms that otherwise may have led to
confusion and inconsistency in its application, including “lethal,”97 “permanently disabling,”98 and “toxic,”99
providing conﬁdence that the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule would only be applied when human experimentation was
truly unethical.
Flexibility built into the Rule is another source of uncertainty. For example, the number of animal species
that must be tested before approval is not mandated. While this ﬂexibility is desirable for individualized
FDA consideration, pharmaceutical companies may have trouble predicting what studies will be necessary.100
The Animal Eﬃcacy Rule does however provide some guidance. It suggests that approval based on a single
animal model should be limited to cases where the model is “suﬃciently well-recognized so as to render
studies in multiple species unnecessary.”101 The Rule also notes that the single species approach is best
suited for anti-infective products because they have well-known pathophysiological mechanisms and well-
characterized animal models.102 These limitations provide important direction, suggesting that for most
products multiple species tests are in fact necessary.
Unfortunately, the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule also never explicitly states the level of pathophysiologic under-
97Final Rule at 37990.
98Id. at 37990.
99Id. at 37990.
100See 21 C.F.R. § 214.610 (a)(2); § 601.91 (a)(2).
101Final Rule at 37991.
102Final Rule at 37991.
21standing needed to support animal–eﬃcacy-based approval. This requirement’s evaluation is simply left as
“a matter of judgment” that may vary from toxin to toxin, infectious organism to infectious organism, or
from product to product, even if they are all designed to treat the same condition.103 This standard will
presumably be clariﬁed as the rule is applied, but it does make inconsistent treatment of products almost
inevitable.104 A better solution would be to remove this provision altogether, as the variety of diseases and
treatments is such that a consistent standard may be impossible, and a standard that varies on a case-by-case
basis is no standard at all.
Despite the FDA’s eﬀorts at clariﬁcation, the ﬂexibility of the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule presents some real risks
for inconsistent treatment of products. Especially in a time when public concern about terrorism is high, the
FDA may experience signiﬁcant pressure to approve products to treat or prevent illnesses from biochemical
or nuclear attacks. The open-ended nature of these regulations presents the real possibility that political
pressure may inﬂuence the FDA to cut corners on animal-eﬃcacy approvals. Until the FDA develops a
precedent for application under the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule, the extent of this danger will be diﬃcult to gauge.
The current precedent consists of a single drug, approved in February 2003: Pyridostigmine Bromide.
A Test Case: Pyridostigmine Bromine
Ironically, the only drug approved thus far under the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule is the very one whose unethical
administration spurred on creation of the rule in the ﬁrst place: pyridostigmine bromide. Fears about PB, as
discussed above, included inadequate information about use of the drug, lack of follow-up by the DOD, and
103Final Rule at 37991-92.
104See lmre Szebik MD. MSc, Clinical Trials Research Group, McGill University, Comment on 64 Fed. Reg. 53960 (December
17, 1999), available at <http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/98n0237/98n-0237-c000003.pdf>.
22concerns about side eﬀects associated with the drug. While no information about subsequent administration
of this drug is yet available, the approval of PB highlights some of the aspects of the new review process,
and suggests that added protections of the heightened review may not be very strong.
First, while general outlines of the postmarketing studies were submitted, detailed protocols were not to be
prepared until later.105 This suggests that postmarketing research is already a relatively low priority for
the manufacturer, and possibly the FDA as well. Unfortunately the usual incentives for a manufacturer to
provide detailed postmarketing studies are not really present for PB: the manufacturer is the U.S. Army
Medical Research and Material Command, and the drug is only intended for military use. While the military
certainly should be concerned about its relationship with the FDA, it has more leverage than a comparable
pharmaceutical manufacturer and therefore need not be as solicitous of FDA approval of how it handles
postmarketing studies. If the inadequate studies by the DOD after its previous PB use are any indicator,
military follow-up leaves much to be desired. It is not at all clear that postmarketing studies under Animal
Eﬃcacy Rule approval will be any better than those performed during the First Gulf War.
The provisions for “restricted use” also provided no added protection in the case of PB – the FDA found
that distribution need not be restricted. It is not clear what restrictions were originally contemplated by the
regulation, but concerns raised about interactions between PB and nicotine or temperature106 apparently
were not felt to be serious,107 although current research continues to point to PB as a possible factor in
105See Approval letter from Robert Temple, Director, Oﬃce of Drug Evaluation, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, to
Colonel Gere, Commanding General, U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command, at 4 (February 5, 2003), available
at <http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/appletter/2003/20414ltr.pdf> [hereinafter “Approval Letter”].
106See, e.g., Beatrice Alexandra Golomb, A Review of the Scientiﬁc Literature as it Pertains to Gulf War Illnesses: Volume
2: Pyridostigmine Bromide, ch. 6 (RAND 1999), available at
<http://www.gulﬂink.osd.mil/library/randrep/pb paper/mr1018.2.chap6.html>
107The package insert does, however, note some other drug interactions and their eﬀects. Pyridostigmine Bromide Package
Insert, at 5, available at <http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/label/2003/020414lbl.pdf> [hereinafter “Package Insert].
23Gulf War Syndrome.108 The package insert language limits this drug to military combat use,109 and no
promotional materials were prepared by the manufacturer.110 While the FDA did not speciﬁcally note this
in its approval, it is likely that this self-imposed limitation may have made further limitation by the FDA
seem unnecessary.
It is interesting to note that additional studies were apparently required by the FDA even after approval.111
The fact that further study was apparently required by the FDA apart from the regular postmarketing
studies required by the regulation raises questions about the quality of evidence available at the time of
approval.
The proposed package labeling does seem to address concerns about the use of PB in the First Gulf War,
namely that soldiers were not aware of the drug’s experimental nature, its possible side-eﬀects, its purpose,
or its proper administration. A ten-page physician’s package insert provides a great deal of information to
the prescribing doctor, including a fairly detailed explanation of the animal eﬃcacy studies performed, the
mechanism by which PB is thought to work, its pharmacokinetics, known side eﬀects and interactions, con-
traindications, administration method, and dosage.112 This information does not appear to be signiﬁcantly
more detailed than many other prescription drugs apart from the more elaborate explanation of eﬃcacy
testing. Patient labeling uses less technical language but still includes information about the animal studies
performed, clear instructions for administering the drug, contraindications, and instructions for what to do
108Kimberly Sullivan et al., Cognitive Functioning in Treatment-Seeking Gulf War Veterans: Pyridostigmine Bromide Use
and PTSD, 25 J. Psychopathology & Behav. Assessment 95-103 (2003) (ﬁnding that Gulf War veterans who had been
exposed to PB performed worse on various psychological and neurological tests that did their unexposed colleagues); J.I. Moss,
Many Gulf War Illnesses may be Autoimmune Disorders Caused by the Chemical and Biological Stressors, Pyridostigmine
Bromide, and Adrenaline 56 Medical Hypotheses, 155–57 (2001).
109Package Insert, at 1.
110Approval Letter, at 4.
111Approval Letter, at 4.
112Package Insert, at 1-10.
24if side eﬀects are observed.113 This labeling, if properly given to soldiers along with their dose of PB, makes
the proper use of the drug very clear and should address concerns about inadequate patient information
during the First Gulf War.
In all, little has changed from the previous approval of PB under the Interim Rule, and many apparent
safeguards of the new process seem to be ineﬀective. Still, the new labeling requirements and the possibility
of more FDA oversight in postmarketing testing do represent improvements over the administration of the
drug during the First Gulf War. Time will tell whether these new safeguards prove as eﬀective as the FDA
hopes.
Conclusion
The current Animal Eﬃcacy Rule represents an ethical solution to a particularly salient problem. Global
terrorism coupled with conventional conﬂict with rogue nations makes an encounter with biological, chemical,
and nuclear weapons ever more likely. Although no testing method is free of error, eﬃcacy studies in animals
at least provide an approval option for drugs that treat life-threatening conditions. Approval under the Rule
will certainly involve diﬃcult decisions, but none that are qualitatively diﬀerent than the drug approvals
the FDA makes on a regular basis. Still, the high-proﬁle nature of many drugs eligible for the rule makes
constant monitoring of the rule’s application important. While this sort of danger might be overcome with
conscientious supervision, the Animal Eﬃcacy Rule still suﬀers from an important defect: it is likely beyond
the FDA’s statutory authority. Such an innovative change in practice, even if only applied in limited numbers,
is still an inappropriate means to eﬀect change because it transgresses on Congress’s policy prerogatives. A
legislative solution, even one substantially identical to the current Animal Eﬃcacy Rule, is the best method
113Package Insert, at 11-13.
25of providing for drug development in while maintaining a commitment to the legal boundaries of agency
action.
26